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Post-Communist Transition to Democracy and Problems in the Balkans: Case of Bosnia- Herzegovinia
7
n
judges.
12
These institutions, for failing to reflect the free will of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, led to the
legitimacy of their actions and even the Dayton System itself questionable in long term.
2.1 Office of High Representative (OHR)
Under the regulation of DAP, the coordination of the civilian implementation has been granted to the Peace
Implementation Council (PIC), consisting of 55 countries and established in 1995. PIC has exercised its influence
through the Office of the High Rerpresentative(OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina
.
Appointed by PIC and endorsed by a UN Security Council resolution the OHR is an international organization
special to BiH and has served as ‘the final authority in theathre regarding interpretation of (the DPA) on the civil-
ian implementation of the peace settlement’
13
According to the documents of PIC, OHR is responsible for the
monitoring of civilian implementation, coordination and mobilization of the international actors involved in the
implementation process, liaising with the international military forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, rule of law, the
protection of human rights, the the return of refugees, a free marked economy open to the World and lastly eco-
nomic reconstruction as well as reporting to the PIC, the UN and other involved actors.
14
In 1997, new decisions
will be added for expanding the authority of the High Representatives.
The enforcement of these decisions has depended on the OHR’s credibility, the support of the international peace
keeping troops and the good- will and cooperation of the local actors (International Crisis Group, 2007:14).
Besides these objective conditions, the personality of the High Representatives has also an important role. In this
context, it would be meaningful to examine the OHR’s role in BiH in two phases of the transition.
2.1.1 The Process of Post-War Reconstruction
In the first phase of the transition from 1995 to 2002, between the signing of the DAP and the beginning of the
European integration process, the OHR has fulfilled his tasks with the supports of the international civilian and
military actors in a condition where there was not a common interests among the Bosnian peoples.
In fact, optimistic expectations of the international community regarding the 1996 elections was destroyed soon.
The results of the elections which was held in an environment which has been characterized by the strong ethnic
hostility has shown that this election only reinforced the positions and gave legitimacy to the three major ethnic
parties, the SDS, the HDZ and the SDA. This has led to the postponement of municipal elections (International
Crisis Group, 1999: 13). After the elections, serious problem emerged on the issues such as the meeting of the
House of Representatives, House of Peoples and three-member Presidency etc. The deficiencies in the functioning
of the common institutions complemented with the local leaders boycotting the return of refugees and continued
human right violations (High Representative, 1996).
Realising that the democratic election alone is not sufficient to implement the Dayton conditions, the internation-
al community has changed his attitude and PIC at its 1997 meeting in Bonn, agreed in granting additional powers
to the OHR to avoid the implementation of the DAP being delayed or obstructed by local nationalist politicians.
Through these additional authority, known as the Bonn Powers, the High Representative has had the authority
to change and influence the composition and decisions of elected institutions such as the assemblies and gov-
ernments, to amend constitutions, to overturn judicial decisions, to remove elected officials obstructing Dayton
implementation (PIC Main Meeting, 1997). Thus, the BiH was turned into a semi-protectorate. Since then, the
High Representatives has used the Bonn Powers to perform the following objectives in general.
12 Grewe/Riegner, ibid, p. 38).
13 General Framework Agreement Annex 10, article V.
14 General Framework Agreement, Annex 10, article II