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Nuray BOZBORA
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4
Firstly, this division (separation) highly corresponds to the distribution of three ethnic populations, and therefore
legitimizes the results of wars among them. In other words, this territorial division, in a sense, have legalized the
loses and gains of the the fighting sides. This also pawed the way to higly ethnicization of political and social life in
entities and cantons. Despite the fact that the BiH Constitution does not state any direct association between ter-
ritoriality and ethnicity, this division (separation) is actually perceived quite opposite. Such a perception provided
the autonomous structures which are stronger than central government with a base to pursue nationalist policies.
It is possible to follow its concrete outcomes in high vote percentages gained by ethnic-oriented political parties in
local elections, in education and also in the policies implemented for safe return of the refugees.
Secondly, the high autonomy bestowed to the Entities and the cantons have brought out a decentralized structure
in which political power is exercised heavily by local political powers while central political power remained weak.
That the local powers exert dominance in the elections for central powers of the state (legislation, execution and
jurisdiction) have contributed to ethnicization of politics all over BiH.
1.3. Ethnic Power-Sharing at the Central Level; ‘Common Institutions’ of the State
‘Common institutions’ of BiH, literally reflects the consociational model of ethnic power sharing, both in terms
of composition and functioning. This is expressed in the best way through the application of ethnic quotas and
ethnic veto.
In terms of the composition of the common institutions of state the basic principle here is the ethnic quota system.
BiH constitution establishes a system of ethnic quotas which ensures equal representation for all three constitu-
ent people. Accordingly, the composition of some of the state institutions constitutionally subject to rigid ethnic
quotas, but in practice equal ethnic representation is preserved for all state institutions.
The central executive body is composed of three-member Presidency and the Council of Ministers. Members
of Presidency are elected by the legislative bodies of Entitities and are subject to ethnic quotas; Bosniac and one
Croat members are elected by the legislative body of the Federation of the Bosnia Herzegovina and Serb member
is elected by the Assemly of Republika Srpska.
3
The central legislature body is consist of two chambers, the House of Peoples and the House of Representative.
15 members of the House of Peoples are elected by the legislative bodies of two entities and are subject to ethnic
quotas. Five Croat and five Bosniak members are elected by legislative body of the Federation of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina and remaning five Serb members are elected by legislative body of Republica Srpska.
4
In contrast, 42 del-
egates of the House of Representative are elected in entitywide polls through direct elections and are not subject
to ethnic quotas but it is only required 28 delegates have to be elected in the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina
and 14 in Republika Srpska.
5
The state judicial body, the Constitutional Court of the BiH is designed as hybrid institution which is composed of
six local and three international judges. Three international judges are appointed by the President of he European
Court of Human Rights after consultation with the State Precidency of BiH, while of the six local judges four are
elected by the legislative body of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and two by legislative body of Repub-
lica Srpska.
6
Although BiH Constitution does not require any ethnic quota among the local judges, in practice,
of the four judges elected in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina two are Croats and two Bosniacs and two
judges elected in Republika Srpska are Serbs.
The basic principle in the functioning of common state institutions requires ethnic consensus in decision-making
is ensured. There are two dimensions of it. The first dimension relates to the composition of a majority vote
required for passing legislation. In principle, while it is enough to have majority of those present and voting in
both chambers in order to pass legislation, the constitution urges that a majority vote must include at least one-
3 General Framework Agreement, Annex 4,Constitution of BiH, article, V
4 General Framework Agreement, annex 4, Constitution of BiH, article IV,1
5 General Framework Agreement, annex 4, Constitution of BiH, article IV,2
6
General Framework Agreement, annex 4, Constitution of BiH, articles V and VII