1.Karadeniz ve Balkan Ekonomik ve Politik Araştırmalar Sempozyumu

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Post-Communist Transition to Democracy and Problems in the Balkans: Case of Bosnia- Herzegovinia
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third of the delegates and members from the territory of each Entity. If does not, “the Chair and Deputy Chairs
shall meet as a commission and attemp to obtain approval within three days of the vote. If these efforts fail, deci-
sions shall be taken by a majority of those present and voting, provided that the dissenting votes do not include
two-thirds or more of the Delegates or members elected from either Entity”7 The other dimension relates to the
‘vital interest’ veto right granted to the constituent peoples. According to the Constitution, a proposed decision
of the Parliamentary Assembly may be declared to be destructive of a ‘vital interest’ of the Bosniac, Croat or Serb
people by a majority of the Bosniac, Croat, or Serb Delegates. Such a proposed decision shall require the approval
of the majority of Bosniac, Croat and Serb delegates present and voting in the House of Peoples. If a majority of
the Bosniac, Croat or Serb delegates objects to it, as is usually the case, the Chair of the House of Peoples immedi-
ately convene a Joint Commission comprising three Delegates, one each selected by the Bosniac, by the Croat, and
by the Serb delegates, to resolve the issue. If the Commission fails to resolve the issue within five days, the matter
is referred to the Constitutional Court.8
1.4 The Problems Encountered in Consociational Model in BİH Democracy
As it is above mentioned, it was aimed to bring stability and to integrate the conflicting segments of the society
through the application of consociational model in BiH democray. However, although this model has brought a
certain degree of stability, failed in the establishment of unified multi-ethnic democracy.
BiH constitution recognizes ethnicity as a constitutioal category. Thus the definition of citizenship, territorial
autonomy and power-sharing was based on collective rights and equality of the three ethnic groups who are
considered to be constituent peoples. However, this model has also brought a number of problems emerged with
some negative consequences in the case of BiH.
The overemphasis on ethnic collectives has led to the strengthening of collective identities. And ethnic voting
system resulted in the radical nationalist political parties came to the power repeatedly by taking the highest vote
in the democratic elections.
Territorial autonomy which reflects the ethnic divisions, has increased the propensity of ethnic homogenization
in these autonomous structures, Republica Sırpska and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The privileges
that are granted to specific ethnic groups ( to Serbs in Republika Srpska and, respectively, Croatian and Bosniacs
in the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina ) in the sub-state constitutions enacted by the Entites has damaged the
principal of equality of constituent people in the BiH Constitution, at the level of Entities. The best example of
this is the definition of citizenship in their constitutions. According to their constitutions, Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina is an Entity of “Bosniacs and Croats as constituent peoples along with others” 9 while Republika
Srpska is the “State of Serb people and all of its citizens”10 . Such statements seem to be the expression of a kind
of ethnic sovereignty at the entity level. Considering the extensive powersof the Entities in matters of property,
polices, criminal and civil Law, judiciary and taxes, besides regulating the cizitenship of entity, the propensity of
ethnic homogenization in the Entities not only leads to serious human rights violations, but also made it difficult
to compromise in the common state institutions and damaged the effectiveness of the central government.
System of ethnic quotas and guaranteed minimum representation in the central government which ensures equal
representation for all three constituent peoples has led to the exclusion of the people who do not identify them-
selves as a member of one constituent people from the state organs. In this respect, system of ethnic quotas, in the
case of BiH, destructs the principle of democratic equality.
On the other hand, ethnic veto rights in legislative and executive decison making has some problematic effects
on the legislative and executive process. A majority of representatives of each constitutient peoples can block
legislation they deem destructive to ‘vital interests’ of their ethnic group. Each single member of Presidency can
7 General Framework Agreement, annex 4, Constitution of BiH, Article IV, 3
8 General Framework Agreement, annex 4, Constitution of BiH, Article IV, 3
9 Constitution of FBiH, )
10 Republica Srpska Constitution. Art.I. available at )