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Nuray BOZBORA

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also block executive decision making for similar reasons. This has led to some groups to gain a disproportionate

impact on the composition of central institutions. Especially the excessive use of ethnic veto has led to prolonga-

tion of the law-making process, and further contributed political inaction and govermental inefficiency.

The problematic effects of consocianitonal model in BiH democracy has led to the emergence of a central govern-

ment rather complicated and inefficient and often living deadlock. Secondly, instead of creating a strong central

government, it has created a political system in which the real authority is in the hands of the local government

while the center is weak. Thirdly, the ethnic control over political authority was strengthened due to the real power

has been given primarily to ethnically defined Entities.

The solution of the problems caused by these problematic effects of consocianital model in BiH democracy was

largely transferred to the responsibility of international institutions. The BiH Constitutional Court, a semi-inter-

national institution with its three international judges and High Representative Office (OHR) which is literally

an international institution, both have functioned as important solution centers in response to the political life

locked on ethnic basis. While the former aimed to ensure a balance and equality between the conflicting parties,

the later has used his overriding legislative powers to transfer competencies from the Entities to the central level

in order to create an unified multi-ethnic democracy in BiH.

2. International Involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Although the international Community’s involvement in post-conflict state-building process is not a new phe-

nomenon, it has been increased over the past decades. The international involvement in the societies in question,

can be effective and even insistent in a wide range of state-building process such as to design a new constitution,

to build new state institutions to reconcile the different segments of society and the political elites on the new con-

stitutional order to prevent the use of new constitutional order for the benefit of a certain segment of the society.

Such an international involvement means not only to limit the areas of internal sovereignty but also prevents the

establishment of a classical liberal constitutional order which requires the recognition of the will of the people.

However, transition to democracy in societies lacking the necessary conditions for the functioning of a consolidat-

ed democracy (a rule of law, a free civil society, generalized trust, spirit of common citizenship etc) can very eas-

ily be halted or reversed. The rights and freedoms secured by democratic system may lead to the enforcement of

radical nationalism as a legitimate ideology. On the other hand the weakness of the new institutions may damage

the proper working of democratic rules. These dangers to transition to democracy can become even stronger in

the post-conflict reconstruction process depending on the object and nature of the conflict, the character and the

content of the arrangements aiming the immediate cessation of conflict, or conflicting groups’ attitude towards

these new regulations. Moreover, the involvement of the international actors in the reconstruction process may

make the situation even more complicate.

International involvement in Bosnia- Herzegovina which started with NATO’s intervention sought to bring an

end to ethnic-violance and was completed with the Dayton Peace Agreement. A pillar of international involve-

ment was the NATO intervention and armed struggle, while the other was to establish a functioning state in

the BiH. DAP included a series of military and civil provisions in order to realize these objectives and has also

specified an extensive role of international actors in the implementation of them. The observance of DPA military

provisions was to be supervised by a multinational implementation Force (IFOR) led by Nato. This international

military involvement will continue to exist under different names to the present day (as SFOR from 1996 to 2004

and EUROFOR from 2004 to the present day )

On the other hand, the international civilian involvement resulted in the creation of new international institu-

tions working alongside national institutions. One of them is the Office of the High Representative (OHR) which

is thoroughly international in nature and has extensive power on the national execuctive and legislative organs.

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The other is the Constitutional Court in which three international judge has been employed together with the local

11 General Framework Agreement, Annex 10, article V