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broadest discussion on the tension between the ethnic power-sharing and the viability of democratic governance
(Issacharoff, 2014: 27-28). Regarding this case, the Constitutional Court has decided that the Entite’s constitu-
tions contravened the preamble of the Bosnian Constitution which included all three ethnic peoples and ‘others’
as constituent people in the whole territory of the country. This decision aiming to remove the ethnic discrimina-
tion or ethnic sovereignty in the Entite’s constitutions owed its acceptance to the simple majority principle and
the lack of any veto rights in the decision making procedure of the Court, besides the votes of the international
judges in favor. Although this decision, as with all other decisions of the Court seems contributing to the level of
democracy and the cooperation, the role played by the international judges in the acceptance of the decision calls
the legitimacy of this decision in question. The hybrid structure of the Constitutional Court further contributes to
the semi-protectorate status of Bosnia under the authority of OHR.
3. Local Actors and the Domestic Politics.
The nature of the disintegration of the SFRY has played an important role in shaping the domestic politics of BiH
after the Dayton Peace Agreement. The constituent republics of SFRY, roughly reflecting the ethnic boundaries
had the character of a nation-state except the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore the disintegration
of Yugoslavia, simply was not to be independent from the federation of republics, this is also a fragmentation of
Yugoslavia along ethnic lines leaving Bosnia and Herzegovina in danger of a further fragmentation in itself while
giving the other constituent republics a chance to have their independent nation-state. As the results of 1990 elec-
tion in SFRY showed, the key determinant of voter behavior was ethnic-national identification. This also meant to
leave from the federation. These two fundamental feature of the 1990 elections in SFRY were equally apparent in
the first democratic elections of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1990. Since then, the politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina
have been trapped into the discourses of ‘integration versus fragmentation’ and ‘ethnic nation versus civic nation’,
as the developments has shown us.
As an internationaly brokered design and signed by the presidents of Federal Republic of Yugoslavya, Croatia,
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the DAP was not an exact reflection of the will of the Bosnian peoples. Since the radi-
cal Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs had been excluded from the negotiation and signing of the DAP, these
groups refused to recognize it. At the same time, for the Bosniacs the recognition of the Republika Srpska was
meant to legitimize the war-time ethnic cleansing and territory grab (Cousens&Cater, 2001: 26-27). As a result,
the Bosnian peoples were not satisfied with the Dayton arrangement and would continue to question it. On the
other hand, the new constitutional system whic is based on ethnic power-sharing has granted a wide autonomy
to the constitutuent elements at the local level. Both, have contributed to the strengthening of nationalist politics,
as a continuous major obstacles for the establishment of a unified multi-ethnic democratic governance in Bosnia.
This can be seen in four main areas of strong nationalist politics; the performance of the nationalist parties in the
elections; different expactations of the three ethnic groups; their attitudes towards the creation of common insti-
tutions and the policies; discriminatory policies at the level of Entities and the cantons.
Debates on the constitutional changes since Dayton Peace Agreement has been an important indicator in terms of
identify the local actors’ basic trends and their basic discourses reflected in these areas (Bieber, 2008).
BiH Constitution is a dysfuntional constitution which was made in the conditions of the war and is contained in
the annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Also it is called ‘Dayton Constitution’. If we take a brief look at the
consequences of this constitutions in terms of the political future of BiH, they are as follows.
‘Dayton Constitution’ has implemented an ethnic democracy. Collective ethnic identities take precedence over
individual identity that is creating serious human rights violations. For example, according to the Constitution, in
procedures for staff of state organs, training and expertise is not the first condition, the first and most important
requirement is ethnic identity. In addition to this, any person who does not identify himself with any one of the
three constituent ethnic group, is not entitled to representation.
International organizations in different forms and formats are active in the military, political and civil life of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina. There is a sovereignty issue, due to any goverment body in BiH does not have full authority
and sovereignty with the exception of Office of High Representative.